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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent farming and food crises have severely shaken public trust in 
modern agrifood systems and the institutions that regulate them.  
Fundamental changes have been demanded in agricultural policy and 
practice.  As a result, central policy institutions which, in this field, are 
renown for their inertia, have been given new political direction and 
objectives; and potentially momentous changes have been initiated to 
reorient farming practices and food production systems.  Thus, 2001 
found both Britain and Germany with new Ministries and Ministers 
setting new directions for agricultural policy.   
 
In Germany, Renate Künast was appointed as the first female agricultural 
minister (and the first in that position to be a non-farmer and a Green) to 
head a revamped Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture.  
In Britain, Margaret Beckett was likewise appointed as the first female 
agricultural minister to head a new Department of the Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs which replaced the old Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food (MAFF). As well as these striking parallels in the 
symbols of a new beginning, there has also been a considerable degree of 
similarity in the new policy directions each has pursued.  Consumer 
interests and consumer protection are to be at the heart of agricultural 
policy; more localised food chains are to be encouraged;  and forms of 
farming that respect the environment, animal welfare and organic 
principles are to be promoted.  Indeed, with a common interest in altering 
the framework for agricultural policy, the two governments have joined 
forces to seek reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy, to 
accommodate the changes they are both pursuing. 
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Our interest in these matters partly arises from wishing to understand 
where this is taking us.  These are policy systems that are changing 
direction but are doing so in the midst of crises.  It is important therefore 
to understand the dynamics and the rationality of decision making under 
crisis.   Events in German and British agriculture in 2001 certainly 
illustrate systems under crisis and, by comparing and contrasting their 
reactions, we hope to tease out what is structuring the new directions 
being taken. 
 
Whilst there are striking similarities between the two cases, there are 
major differences.  The immediate cause for the crisis in Germany was 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE); in Britain it was Foot and 
Mouth Disease (FMD).  German policy in the aftermath is more 
regulatory with organic farming having a central ideological function, 
whereas British policy is pursuing a more market oriented agriculture that 
also promotes stewardship of wildlife and the countryside.  These 
emphases have been present for some time in the respective policy 
systems, but at the margins. Through the exigencies of crisis, they were 
thrust to the fore, to become dominant motifs of the new policy.  Yet, 
they do not offer obvious solutions to the actual and immediate problems 
that precipitated the crises.  On the one hand, it is not self-evident that 
promoting organic farming will, on its own, significantly curb BSE and 
the risks it poses to animal and human health in Germany. On the other 
hand, a more market and conservation oriented agriculture will not make 
Britain immune to future incursions of FMD. 
 
Thus while different animal diseases ushered in quite similar and 
contemporaneous institutional changes in Britain and Germany, they also 
precipitated policy reform outcomes not specifically addressed to the 
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disease-problem that had caused the crisis.  So it seems that the crises 
were the occasion to bring forward reforms that had been prepared in 
advance in the two countries.  The policy reform outcomes can thus be 
characterised as ‘garbage can solutions’, and below we want to explore 
how the Garbage Can Model (Cohen, March, Olsen 1972) might 
illuminate the decision processes involved.  This approach argues that, 
during a crisis, decision makers do not look for the most appropriate 
solution to the problem they face but take those actions that are most 
readily available, acceptable and feasible.  It seems that that is what 
happened in Britain and Germany in 2001.  The immediate effect was not 
a search for the right solution, but was to catalyse policy reforms in food 
and agriculture, by shifting the balance of pro- and anti- forces in the 
society and the economy. 
 
Taking this as the main hypothesis, that the solutions adopted were the 
ones available, it is still important to analyse what contingencies obliged 
governments to pursue these particular courses of reform rather than other 
potential ones. Policy decision making is not only influenced by the 
actors taking part in it. It is also shaped by the economic and institutional 
structures and public opinion. This paper will try to reveal the crucial 
influences on the two sets of policy reforms being pursued in Germany 
and England1 respectively.  
 
                                                
1
 FMD affected all the countries in the UK, but England was most heavily impacted. The policy and 
institutional response has been somewhat different between the countries of the UK and in this paper 
we concentrate on what happened in England. 
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2  THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH: SOLUTIONS SEEKING 
PROBLEMS? 
 
In their celebrated article ‘A Garbage Can Model of Organizational 
Choice’, Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) sought to explain decision 
making in organisations. What they particularly addressed was how, in a 
systematic way, solutions adopted by organisations are not specifically 
devised for the problems they purport to solve.  This argumentation was 
widely discussed in the social sciences for its challenge to prevailing 
notions of the rationality of organisational behaviour, and was the start of 
the development of other theoretical frameworks taking irrational 
decision making into account (e.g. Kingdon 1995, Zahariadis 1999).   
 
Cohen and colleagues argue that an organization “is a collection of 
choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision 
situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to 
which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work.” 
(Cohen, March and Olsen 1972: p.2). That means that, in an organisation, 
problems and solutions are not necessarily related to each other in a 
simple linear or deductive relationship. This arises from the specialisation 
of tasks within organisations.  Various individuals within an organisation 
have the role to develop solutions. Normally these solutions are not 
needed and are therefore shelved (i.e. disposed of in the garbage can). At 
any particular point in time an organisation also faces or pursues an array 
of problems which it must characterise or prioritise, or alternatively, 
avoid or neglect (i.e. dispose in the garbage can).  The garbage can, 
therefore, typically contains various potential solutions and various 
potential problems for the organisation.  In the model, the garbage can is 
seen to act as a reservoir from which organisational decision making can 
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draw. The outcome therefore depends on the mix in the can. Solutions 
and problems have an equal status as separate streams in the organisation. 
Which solutions are ready for airing and which problems are on people’s 
mind are critical. When a given solution is proposed it may be regarded 
by the participants as irrelevant to the problem. Or, even more likely, the 
participants have fixed on a course of action and cast about for a problem 
to which it is the solution. So, a given solution is looking for a problem.  
 
Although the Garbage Can Model was initially developed to explain 
decision making within organisations, several articles and books have 
subsequently applied the model to the analysis of the national political 
system (e.g. Kingdon 1995, Zahariadis 1999). So it seems feasible, at 
least, to use it to analyse national policy making. That being the case, to 
pursue the questions raised in this paper, a framework is needed that 
incorporates the hypothesis of regarding the policy outcomes after BSE 
and FMD as ‘garbage can solutions’; but that also encompasses other 
aspects. The crisis situation raised a severe problem of legitimacy for 
each government. A policy change decided by government alone would 
not have convinced the public. Consequently, in an attempt to solve this 
problem of legitimacy, governmental policy had to integrate solutions 
proposed by non-governmental groups during the crisis. These solutions 
had to be connected to certain public demands and ideologies in order to 
restore public trust in governmental policy. Indeed, Renate Künast 
remarked “I am campaigning for a new agriculture. An agriculture which 
is once again backed by the people” (Künast 2001). That means that 
focussing on the government as the only important actor in the crisis (as 
the garbage can model proposes) is not appropriate. The circumstances 
that influenced decision making during the crises have to be highlighted 
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because they constrained the range of feasible solutions available for the 
governments.  
 
In policy analysis different frameworks have been developed to identify 
the basic influences on policy making (e.g. Sabatier 1999, Héritier 1993). 
Most of them identify three important elements: the structural conditions 
(i.e. the stable environment of the policy field); the situative context (i.e. 
the contingent circumstances); and the actors with their beliefs and their 
strategies (e.g. Sabatier 1999, Jänicke and Weidner 1997, Scharpf 2000). 
These are the elements that frame our analysis of policy decision making 
during the BSE and FMD crises.  
 
Turning to the first element - the structural conditions - the paper 
highlights the respective structure of the agricultural sectors and the 
fundamental sociocultural values and ideologies surrounding agriculture 
and the countryside in Germany and Britain. These stable parameters 
explain the degree of consensus for, or against, certain policy directions 
in the respective countries. Second, the situative context has to be 
described which means looking at the effect the BSE and FMD crises had 
on consumer reactions and public demands concerning food, the 
environment and the countryside. This establishes the pressure on 
government for policy change and also the sort of direction that would fit 
consumer demands. Thirdly, the actors have to be explained which means 
mainly the policy network surrounding agricultural policy, including the 
beliefs and ideologies of the different actors. We do not describe all the 
relevant actors in the policy field, rather we focus on the groups newly 
integrated into policy making, who offered the solutions available during 
the crises. Such groups came to play a crucial role because the 
evaporation of public confidence in the crises meant that established 
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actors in the policy network - such as Ministers, government officials, the 
farming unions and the mainstream political parties - were unable to 
present publicly credible solutions at the time.  
 
After analysing these three elements in policy decision making, it will be 
possible to identify in a fourth sub-section which solution was taken 
during the respective crises and what influences obliged each government 
to take this solution. We consider Germany and Britain in turn before 
comparing these two cases to derive some general conclusions about 
decision making in agricultural policy under crisis. 
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3 THE GERMAN CASE 
3.1  Structural Conditions 
 
German agriculture and agricultural policy in the run-up to the BSE crisis 
gave a reassuring appearance of stability and stasis which actually 
glossed over a situation of substantial change and upheaval.  It is an irony 
that the country whose agriculture has long had a deeply conservative 
image of small family farms now contains, as a consequence of German 
unification, the largest agricultural enterprises in the current European 
Union. The integration and transformation of the East German 
agricultural sector has been (and still is) the most significant challenge to 
the agricultural policy system.  
 
Between 1990 and 1992 the number of employees in East German 
agriculture declined from about 850,000 to about 150,000. More than ten 
years later the legacy of rural unemployment, depression and 
depopulation is still among the most significant problems the Eastern 
Länder have to deal with (Siebert and Laschewski 2001). However, East 
German agriculture itself has experienced a phenomenal turnaround. 
Whereas in the early 1990s there were doubts over whether its large 
farms, in particular the co-operatives, could survive, the European 
Commission more recently proposed a ceiling for direct CAP payments 
for such large farms in the context of the Agenda 2000 negotiations. 
Whilst partly a strategic step, this proposal also reflected the impressive 
productivity growth within East German agriculture. Equally remarkable 
was the forthright rejection of the Commission’s proposal by the German 
Government and the Farmers’ Union. 
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During the 1990s the German Farmers’ Union showed itself to be more 
pragmatic than one could have assumed considering the importance that 
the ideology of family farming played and, to an extent, continues to play 
for the legitimisation of public support for agricultural subsidies.2 The 
term ‘family farm’ refers to a small, non-specialised farm that is owned 
and managed by a farming family. Especially during the 1970s and 
1980s, this model of the family farm was an important objective of 
agricultural policy in West Germany, around which the government had 
deliberately sought to temper structural change in agriculture. Family 
farms were seen as providers of public goods such as an assured supply 
and good quality of food, and environmental protection, but also as 
guarantors of social  peace and stability and a certain morality (Hagedorn 
and Schmitt 1985; Lorenzl and Brandt 1995). On unification, the West 
German family farm seemed to present the appropriate model to fulfil the 
expectations of German society.  
 
Despite this legacy, in 1991 the German Farmers’ Union absorbed as 
regional members newly founded farmers’ unions in the Eastern Länder 
that were the successors of former socialist organisations. This followed 
the failure of attempts to build a new joint organisation, which would 
have included landowner associations mainly representing the interests of 
the old dispossessed peasantry and committed to re-establishing family 
farming in the Eastern Länder (Laschewski 1998). In its pragmatic 
decision to integrate the larger group of farms, the German Farmers’ 
Union thereby gave long-term priority to the unity of farmers’ 
representation even at the expense of a coherent ideology (Heinze and 
                                                
2
 84% of the German public agree that ‘The EU should use the CAP to protect medium or small farms’ 
(Eurobarometer 2002). 
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Voelzkow 1993). Implicit in this shift was greater acceptance amongst 
decision-makers inside both the German Farmers’ Union and the Federal 
Government of the inevitability of structural change, although this was 
not necessarily accepted in wider public opinion. Nevertheless, a new 
focus on competitiveness found expression in the shift of the official 
rhetoric from peasant farming ("bäuerliche Landwirtschaft") to farm 
entrepreneurs (“Landwirtschaftliche Unternehmer”). Not unrelatedly, the 
transformation of agriculture in the East has been accompanied by an 
accelerated restructuring process in the West, the rate of decline in the 
number of farms increasing from about 2% per annum in the 1980s to 
about 3% per annum in the 1990s. 
 
Unification is one of the reasons that this process took place almost 
without public and even academic recognition. Whereas environmental 
problems had encouraged public debate about the direction of farming 
during the 1980s, German society became preoccupied with other issues 
during the following decade, including unemployment, the increasing 
state deficit and the new role of a unified Germany in a changing global 
context. One effect of the BSE-crisis was to reignite public debate about 
agriculture and food.  
 
Before the crisis, agricultural policy making took place in a small circle 
of specialists. Even so, the growing diversity of farm structures and the 
accelerating restructuring process were making it difficult for the 
Farmers’ Union to maintain its claim for exclusive and unified 
representation. As already mentioned, there was opposition from those 
Eastern farmers and landowners that felt discriminated against during the 
restitution process, and who, through an organisational platform called 
the Bauernbond, expressed a conservative small farming ideology closer 
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to some of West Germany’s regional farmers’ associations. Already in 
the West the environmental movement had connected with the concerns 
of those marginalised by modernisation - notably the small farms, 
especially in less favoured agricultural areas. By associating intensive 
farming with larger farms (despite the lack of a clear causal relationship 
between the two), the environmental movement implicitly reinforced the 
social commitment to, and faith in, the family farming model. 
 
The wider platform for expressing opposition to intensive farming is the 
Federation of the German Agrarian Opposition (Dachverband der 
Deutschen Agraropposition DDA, today AgrarBündnis). This was 
founded in 1988 and brought together several environmental and 
consumer organisations, organisations for the prevention of cruelty to 
animals and organisations of organic farmers. The aim was to develop 
and promote an alternative concept of farming to intensive farming which 
would include nature and consumer protection and would promote a 
sustainable way of farming. Organic farming was identified as the 
farming concept which embraced all these issues. It encompasses not 
only a method of production but also the social ideals of localised 
systems of production on small family farms. It is interesting to note how 
much the work of the German Agrarian Opposition focused on organic 
farming as the main instrument of achieving their aims. With the Green 
Party and the environmental movement promoting organic farming as the 
way for sustainable farming the concept has had significant political 
attention focused on it. This platform successfully developed and 
professionalised its activities during the 1990s. Among its most 
prominent activities has been an annual 'critical agricultural report', in 
response to the official report published by the government. 
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In Germany the main focus for the politicians and the environmental 
groups concerned with the countryside is on agriculture and farming and 
not, as in some other countries, on a concept of rural development which 
includes, in addition, other activities that take place in rural areas. Of 
course, in Germany too there is no shortage of ideas, discussions and 
proposals for rural development but they are overshadowed by agrarian 
concerns. A second factor is an institutional one. In the very complex 
federal system political and administrative competencies are sharply 
delineated and observed.  The actions of the Federal agricultural ministry 
are strongly guided by a clear sense of what is its domain. Even the idea 
of farm diversification raises conflicts not only between ministries but 
also between the Federal and the Länder governments.  
 
Beside the political and public influences on agriculture, the specific 
characteristics of the food sector structures consumer demands in certain 
directions. As with other Western countries, there is a trend towards 
increasing concentration in food retailing. A distinctive feature is the 
prominent position of the discounters who have a rising share of the 
grocery market, currently standing at 29%. Food retailing is thus very 
competitive and oriented towards low-priced consumer demand. 
Nevertheless, there is some demand for speciality and high quality foods 
which command higher prices. Germany is currently the largest EU 
market for organic foods and this has been explained in terms of food 
safety and environmental concerns (Michelsen 2001) and the better taste 
of some vegetables. Even so, organic farming still remains a niche 
product. Most consumers are price-oriented, forcing the farmers and 
retailers to offer food as cheaply as possible. 
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3.2  Situative Context 
 
The BSE crisis in Germany was so cataclysmic for the agricultural sector 
because of the severe public reaction it induced - a reaction that was 
reflected and stimulated by a mass media not normally interested in 
agricultural issues.  
 
The general public reaction was, first of all, acute concern about food 
safety, especially about beef, which for a short period led to a complete 
collapse of beef sales (ZMP 2001). Nobody wanted to eat beef without 
further information about the risks from BSE.  The Government was quite 
unprepared for this deep public reaction.   
 
Amidst deep public concern about food safety, organic farming was 
hailed as BSE-free by the environmental movement, several politicians 
and the mass media (e.g. Künast 2001). This led to a steep rise in demand 
for organic meat which rose sharply in price. In this period, many 
German consumers temporarily abandoned either their normal meat-
eating habits or their normal cost-sensitivity, turning instead to expensive 
organic food or even exotic meat such as ostrich steak. 
 
Driven by the public demand for more information about food safety, the 
mass media started to scrutinise the agricultural sector more closely. Until 
BSE the German public had shown little interest in, or awareness of, the 
way the sector worked and how it was supported (Eurobarometer 2000). 
The more people learned about the production system, the involvement of 
the food and feed industry and the limited controls, the more anxious they 
became about the way in which food is produced, processed and 
distributed. There was the shock of recognition that the silent revolution 
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of technological change had created a type of agriculture that had little to 
do with the images of the 1950s and 1960s that still dominated children’s 
books and the popular imagination. 
 
The BSE crisis was characterised as the “Chernobyl“ of the agricultural 
sector (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 20013) i.e. an event that shattered 
faith in the established system. The political support for intensive farming 
and the very close links between farming leaders, politicians and the food 
industry - that previously had occasioned little comment - became matters 
of deep contention.  Wholesale change and transparency in the production 
system was what was now demanded (WWF 2001). 
 
The BSE crisis thus induced, at least temporarily, an increased demand 
for organic and health foods, a collapse in the legitimacy for the 
politicians and interest representatives involved in the established policy 
network for agriculture and a demand for a new agricultural policy with 
environmental and food safety issues at its core. Even though these 
reactions had force for only a few months, they were very powerful 
during the crisis and forced the government to react. 
3.3  The actors 
 
As mentioned earlier, until the BSE-crisis agricultural policy making took 
place in a kind of ‘closed shop’ that involved politicians with strong 
linkages to the sector itself, or related businesses and associations, and 
the Farmers' Union. Other groups struggled to influence decision making 
from the outside (Mehl 1997, Ratschow 2003). However, the BSE crisis 
overwhelmed these arrangements. As the established policy network was 
                                                
3
 11th March 2001. 
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held responsible for the course of developments which had led to the BSE 
crisis, the participants in the network had to deal with an immense 
problem of legitimacy during the crisis.  
 
Until this point agriculture had not been central to the politics of the 
government coalition.  Within the coalition agricultural policy was the 
responsibility of the senior partner, the Social Democrats (SPD). The 
Minister Karl-Heinz Funke and the Chancellor had pursued an approach, 
that had not been popular with the farmers, of promoting the case for 
structural change in agriculture to improve its international 
competitiveness. 
 
One week after the first confirmed BSE case in Germany, Chancellor 
Schröder made a remarkable volte-face and thus regained the initiative. In 
a speech to the German Parliament on December 1st 2000 he blamed the 
BSE problem on “industrial agriculture” (“agrarindustrie), a phrase 
connoting large, specialised and intensive farms and the supply and 
processing firms connected to them. Schröder thus directed his criticism 
on to the type of agriculture that policy so far had seemed to favour. 
Minister Funke, who only a few weeks before the crisis had reassured the 
public that they could trust German food, was obliged to resign. 
 
To underline his intention of a dramatic shift in policy, Schröder 
transferred the agricultural portfolio to his junior coalition partner, the 
Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), who were renowned for their 
critical view of established agricultural policy and its problems. Putting 
agricultural policy in the hands of the Green Party was necessary to 
convince an anxious public of the government’s willingness to confront 
the problem of BSE and to redirect agricultural policy. 
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The new Minister, Renate Künast, was in many respects a surprising 
choice.4 She had lived her whole life in cities without any expressed 
interest in agriculture or rural development issues, but as the speaker of 
the Federal Green Party she was very close to the inner circle of national 
Green policy making.  
 
In public, the decision not to draw on a Green agricultural specialist had 
strong symbolic implications. Künast could be presented as not being 
compromised by connections to farmers at all. At the same time she also 
represented the shift that was foreseen by renaming the former Ministry 
for Food, Agriculture, and Forestry as the Ministry of Consumer 
Protection, Food and Agriculture. Until then, Consumer Protection had 
not been institutionalised as a policy arena in one particular ministry. This 
additional competence was a concession from Mr. Schröder, to encourage 
the Green Party to give up the much larger and more important Health 
Department. From the point of view of the Green Party the incorporation 
of this area opened up strategic options with a long term perspective 
going well beyond agriculture and food in a policy area were the party 
had its strongest standing in public opinion. 
 
In keeping with this new structure, Renate Künast announced that the 
focus of agricultural and food policy was to shift from the farmer to the 
consumer (Künast speech 8 February 2001). A key phrase in the new 
strategy was "preventive consumer protection". The lack of a coherent 
policy for consumer protection regarding food safety meant a need, but 
                                                
4
 Her appointment was the outcome of internal Green Party power struggles and the need to balance the 
representation of different groups in the Government. From the Green Party rationale the Minister had 
to be a woman (the other two Green Ministers in the Government are men). 
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also an opportunity for political regulation and institutional design, 
including a series of measures to regulate livestock feed (for an overview 
see BMVEL 2002). 
 
There was a more general need to restore public faith in agricultural 
policy. As a member of the Green Party, Künast was very critical of 
established policy, and she called for a radical turnaround in agriculture 
(“Agrarwende”). This opened up the agenda to the 
environmental/alternative movement, even though they were not part of 
the established policy network for agriculture. They were able to use their 
own networks, including the German Agrarian Opposition, to co-ordinate 
their lobbying and campaigning. The environmental/alternative groups 
still enjoyed public trust because they were the ones who had most 
prominently criticised established agricultural policy over recent years. 
More particularly, over the years it was they who had established in 
public discourse a critique of industrial agriculture - its causes and 
consequences - which politicians and the mass media had seized upon in 
an effort to understand the crisis. 
 
Now, WWF Germany, the NABU (the German bird protection 
organisation) and the BUND (the umbrella organisation for local 
environmental action groups) together issued a series of articles and 
surveys about agriculture and the environment, supporting the case for 
environmental measures and organic farming (e.g. WWF/ NABU 2001). 
The organic farming movement itself (Arbeitsgemeinschaft bäuerliche 
Landwirtschaft AbL, Bioland) also published articles but formulated 
much stronger demands for agricultural policy than did WWF and 
NABU. These various statements and reports did not greatly impinge 
directly on public opinion, where the mass media had much more 
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influence than the green groups. But the publications were sent to the 
Ministry to inform the new policy direction. Implementing modulation in 
Germany and strengthening organic farming are two issues where the 
green groups achieved their aim.  Previously, reflecting the objections of 
the Farmers’ Union, the German government had been opposed to 
modulation (i.e. the switching of some of farmers’ production subsidies to 
provide incentives for sustainable agriculture and rural development, i.e. 
from the CAP’s First Pillar to the Second Pillar). Now this was accepted 
as a means to reorient agricultural policy through promoting organic and 
welfare-friendly farming and other agri-environmental programmes. 
 
Thus, during the crisis the German agricultural policy subsystem 
changed. Forced by the problem of legitimacy, the established policy 
network, which was closely connected to farmers’ interests, was unable to 
present acceptable solutions. With the appointment of Renate Künast the 
beliefs and the solutions of the Agrarian Opposition and the 
environmental movement gained access to agricultural policy making. 
3.4  The adopted solutions 
 
As outlined above, a number of political initiatives by the new Minister 
sought to broaden the action arena of agricultural policy towards related 
industries, such as food processing and feeding stuff industries, and to 
define a new political arena - consumer protection - going far beyond 
agriculture. Renate Künast, with her background in Green politics, was 
comfortable with a rhetoric that blamed intensive farming for causing 
health and environmental risks. The policy changes that addressed 
farming directly were centred on organic farming which was promoted 
“as a role model for farming in general” (Künast 2001).  Already in 
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spring 2001 the Ministry announced an increase in the share of land used 
for organic farming from 3% to 20% as a political goal.  
 
However, the core problem for the Federal government for the 
implementation of the new agricultural policy was that rural development 
and agri-environmental policy (under which organic farming is publicly 
funded) is a competence of the Länder. It is also organised in a five-year 
plan that could not easily be amended during the crisis (such amendment 
necessitating joint Federal-Länder negotiations). Finally, modulation also 
requires co-funding, and Künast was faced with the task of convincing a 
sceptical Minister of Finance to allocate additional money to an already 
highly subsidised sector. In consequence, a substantial increase of 
subsidies to organic farming was not possible in the short term. The 
Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture made a virtue of 
necessity by setting up a Federal Programme for Organic Farming, 
designed by a small group of experts, to support a wide range of 
initiatives to inform consumers, producers and the food industry, and 
finance extension services and research. The other approach has been the 
implementation of the EU organic farming directive, including the Law 
on Organic Farming that sets up a control system and enforcement rules 
and a uniform certificate (“BioSiegel”) to increase transparency for the 
consumers. 
 
With a new rural development plan that started with the year 2003 
subsidies to organic farmers have now substantially increased. The 
possibilities to finance investments for processing and marketing have 
also been improved. The latter is not only limited to organic farming. In 
an action programme "Bäuerlicher Landwirtschaft" (peasant farming) - a 
remarkable return to earlier years - the government recently outlined a 
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broader approach of a multifunctional agriculture that is primarily 
directed to family farming (BMVEL 2003) that sees diversification as a 
major strategy. The rationale is that small farms are not well served by 
direct payments and that further subsidies are justified in recognition of 
the public goods they provide. A shift towards the CAP’s Second Pillar is 
therefore promoted in favour of small, diversified farms and subsidies 
linked to environmental criteria. 
  
In summary, at the height of the BSE crisis, the German public’s acute 
anxieties over food safety led to irresistible demands for a change in the 
direction of agricultural policy. However, for a short period of just a few 
months the old agricultural policy network was not able to present 
acceptable solutions because it had lost legitimacy. The resultant change 
in the policy network allowed new actors, particularly Renate Künast and 
her connections in the environmental/alternative movement, to put 
forward their solution to the crisis, namely "preventive consumer 
protection" based on a concept of sustainable agriculture that sees a vital 
role for small farms and has organic farming as its core philosophy. In 
keeping with this outlook, the state is also seen to have a proactive role in 
protecting and supporting farmers and in fostering a rural economy based 
on agriculture and the food sector.  
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4.0  THE BRITISH CASE 
 
4.1 The structural conditions 
 
In certain crucial respects the structural conditions in England contrast 
sharply with those in Germany.  England is a long urbanised society 
where few people have personal or family connections to farming.  It has 
the most concentrated farm structure in Europe and one in which 
capitalist relations of production have been a dominant aspect for several 
centuries.  It is not a country therefore in which agrarian ideologies are 
strong.  Family farming is certainly not revered, and politicians and 
policy remain indifferent to particular models or systems of agriculture.  
Through its Imperial past, England became used to relying on food 
imports, and an urban public and government look to the food industry, 
including distributors, processors and retailers, to ensure food supply.  
While agrarian ideologies are comparatively weak, countryside ideologies 
are strong and deeply rooted.  A long urbanised society has idealised the 
countryside and has looked to it as a place of retreat from cosmopolitan 
and industrialising forces (Lowe, Murdoch and Cox 1995). 
 
In this context, agricultural policy does not have the unquestioned 
importance it enjoys in other Western European countries.  Other policy 
fields, such as conservation and rural policy, express priorities for the 
countryside that compete, and sometimes conflict, with food production.  
Thus, unlike in Germany, financial support for farmers has long attracted 
public criticism (Grant 1997). The view has prevailed that the Common 
Agricultural Policy was never in Britain’s interest but had to be accepted 
for Britain to be allowed to join the Common Market.  Over the years of 
Britain’s membership of the European Community, public and press 
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attitudes have failed to become reconciled to the CAP as the appropriate 
framework for British agriculture.  Criticism of it reached a frenzy in the 
1980s in a political climate strongly infected by both Euro-scepticism and 
neo-liberalism.  The panoply of market interventions under the CAP 
became the butt of endless press and political derision.  Lacking public 
legitimacy and with a political establishment that regarded the CAP as an 
alien policy, the policy regime has tended to externalise its problems, 
seemingly lurching from one crisis to another (Drummond et al 2000). 
 
The crises of the 1980s and early 1990s were those of overproduction, 
overspending, trade wars, environmental destruction and occasional food 
scares.  Politicians, interest groups and the media were inclined to blame 
all of these on what were seen as the CAP’s excessive subsidies and 
regulations.  The prevalent view in Britain then was that the CAP should 
be dismantled and agriculture exposed to the free market.  The 
unwillingness of other Member States and the Commission to 
countenance such a course of action meant that British political leaders 
could conveniently blame the ills of agriculture and the CAP on European 
vested interests. Thus, although agriculture passed through a succession 
of crises, this was not seen to threaten the legitimacy of British 
governmental and political processes.  Instead it was a factor that fuelled 
popular and political disaffection with the European Community. Since 
the mid-1990s, though, perspectives have changed somewhat. The 
Labour Government first elected in 1997 has been more pro-EU than its 
predecessors and has sought to take a constructive approach to CAP 
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reform.  More momentously, BSE - which was by far the worst of the 
crises to afflict agriculture - originated in Britain5.  
 
The successive food scares experienced since the mid-1980s have posed a 
dilemma to governments whose instincts have been deregulatory, of how 
to respond to periodic consumer clamour for tougher regulations.  A 
significant response has been to look to the corporate sector to help 
safeguard the consumer6.  In particular, end-retailers, with their need to 
maintain consumer confidence, have been thrust into a prominent position 
as key arbiters of health, safety and environmental standards.  Both 
consumers and government have vested a great deal of trust in the major 
supermarkets.  The number of outlets they own and their share of the 
market have grown steadily over the years which has helped to embed 
one-stop shopping and its habitualness into English culture.  The top six 
multiple grocery retailers currently have over 90% of the total grocery 
market (Nielsen 2002).  This gives them considerable power to 
orchestrate and monitor food supply chains.  They do so through 
elaborate vertical supply linkages with food processors and producers.  
Their increasingly commanding role has not gone unchallenged, however, 
especially by those who feel squeezed by it, including the smaller 
farmers, processors and retailers.  Nevertheless, by projecting themselves 
                                                
5
 BSE was first recognised as a new disease in cattle in 1985 and, over the following years, to counter 
an adverse consumer response, the British government sought to reassure the public that eating beef 
was safe.  The announcement in 1996 of a new variant in humans of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, most 
likely caused by BSE, seriously undermined public trust in Britain’s own domestic structures and 
procedures to protect consumers, and created a widespread belief that food safety was subordinate to 
production imperatives within the old MAFF. 
 
6
 There have been limits to the extent to which government could cede responsibility for food safety.  
In particular, the BSE/CJD crisis demanded a demonstrative response from government, and one of the 
commitments of the incoming Labour Government of 1997 was to establish an independent Food 
Standards Agency that would remove from MAFF its responsibilities for overseeing food safety. 
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as the consumers’ champion, they have been remarkably effective in 
legitimating their concentrated market power.  This has required of them 
an acute sensitivity and responsiveness to consumers’ concerns.7  
 
Public criticism of farm subsidies and successive crises in agricultural 
policy have led to incessant demands to open up agricultural decision 
making beyond the farming unions and agricultural officials.  One 
grouping that has taken advantage of this opening up of the established 
policy network has been the environmental lobby which has always had a 
strong orientation towards protection of the countryside.  In the UK, 
major elements of the rural environmental lobby, such as the National 
Trust and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, are over a 
hundred years old.  These are typically large and centralised organisations 
which have passive, mass memberships and employ teams of expert 
lobbyists and conservationists.  The political style of these organisations 
is that of accommodation and persuasive expertise, rather than 
confrontation and radicalism (Lowe and Goyder 1983).  They have long 
been accepted as partners in public policy although they only established 
a toehold in agricultural policy in the early 1980s when their criticism of 
contemporary farming practices for the damage done to rural landscapes 
and habitats helped initiate agri-environmental policy (Lowe et al 1986). 
The  objectives  they  pursue  -  of  biodiversity  and  landscape 
conservation - tend to be associated with traditional and less intensive 
farming, but they pursue these objectives across the countryside and the 
                                                
7
 A report by the Competition Commission (2000) into whether the supermarkets were abusing their 
power concluded that they were broadly competitive, did not have excessive profits or prices, but were 
seen as providing the variety and range of foods at different prices which the British public generally 
demanded. 
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critical factor for them is often to do with specific farming practices (e.g. 
hedgerow and field margin management).  These organisations have 
studiously refrained from giving a general endorsement to organic 
farming or from expressing a position on the desirable scale of farming.  
This is because they remain pragmatic and empirical about what types of 
farming favour conservation. 
 
A long urbanised society has not only idealised the countryside but has 
also established other roles for rural areas besides food production.  
Conservation is one such role.  But the countryside is very important for 
recreation and tourism too: some 70 million domestic tourism visits and 
1.3 billion leisure day visits are made annually to the English countryside. 
It is also a place of residence and commercial activity: approximately 14 
million (or 28%) of England’s population live in rural areas and 5 million 
people work in rural locations. Agricultural employment, which is now 
below 350,000, is a small component of the rural economy. 
4.2  Situative Context 
 
The FMD epidemic of 2001 proved to be the most serious animal 
epidemic in the UK in modern times and the  worst Foot and Mouth 
outbreak to be tackled that the world has seen.  The disease was first 
detected on 20th February.  Unfortunately, by then, (yet still unbeknown) 
it was already widespread across the country (Defra 2002). 
 
With the exception of some panic buying of food in the first week 
triggered by concerns that the animal movement ban might lead to a 
shortage of supplies of meat in the shops, the outbreak of FMD did not 
precipitate the  widespread panic amongst consumers and the public that 
 26 
the outbreak of BSE did in Germany.  This is not just because FMD is an 
old disease, familiar to science and known not normally to affect humans.  
It is also because UK food suppliers and retailers were used to dealing 
with ‘farming-and-food’ crises (see below), and because British 
politicians and the public had become somewhat inured to the trials and 
tribulations of the agricultural sector.  The Guardian of 22nd February 
summed up the sentiment in its headline: “Farms: yet another crisis”. The 
initial response, outside the farming community, was thus a certain 
weariness rather than any great loss of public confidence. 
 
From the outset and to the end of the epidemic the Government pursued a 
policy of slaughter on infected farms and of stock judged to be at risk of 
spreading the disease.  An alternative policy option of vaccination 
remained under active consideration but was not used. A complete ban on 
the movement of  livestock was introduced on February 23rd. One week 
into the crisis, on February 27th, local authorities were given additional 
powers to close public footpaths to minimise the risk of spreading the 
disease.  Public access to the countryside was effectively terminated 
while the disease was brought under control.  National Park Authorities 
asked people to stay away,  and major visitor attractions shut down. 
 
During March, however, the number of confirmed cases of infected farms 
soared. The scale of the outbreak had overwhelmed the government’s 
contingency planning and for several weeks the disease was out of 
control. In the press, weariness turned to alarm and criticism of the 
government mounted questioning the adequacy and effectiveness of its 
response. 
 
 27 
The blanket closure of the countryside, however, soon came to be seen as 
too draconian, not only in relation to the low risk that walkers and 
members of the public posed of spreading the disease, but also because of 
the devastating impact on tourism and other rural businesses.  Their 
interests, it seemed, were being sacrificed in order to ensure livestock 
exports.  Many rural shops, pubs, restaurants, hotels, guesthouses and 
visitor attractions suffered financial losses.  The fact that farmers were 
compensated for the slaughter of their animals and that the livestock 
sector received other temporary aids raised questions about the rationale 
and the justice of public financial support for agriculture compared to 
other sectors.  In some areas, hoteliers organised protests to draw 
attention to their plight. 
 
Many people also found the culling policy deeply disturbing, especially 
so from mid-March onwards when the Government stepped up the extent 
and the rate of the killing in a desperate effort to get on top of the disease.  
The scale of the slaughter was unprecedented. The backlog of animals to 
be disposed of meant that carcasses were left in open fields.  Hurried 
arrangements for mass burial pits caused environmental concerns.  Strong 
visual images of cows and sheep being shot, pyres of bloated carcasses, 
and white-coated officials saturated the media, and contributed to the 
impression that the countryside was not a safe or pleasant place to visit.  
The destruction of so many animals - the vast majority of them healthy - 
seemed senseless to many people.  The wholesome image of the pastoral 
countryside was tarnished.  Conservationists became alarmed at the 
prospect that the culling policy would denude vast areas of the 
countryside of the livestock that conserve the landscape and threatened 
the very existence of certain rare and traditional breeds of sheep. 
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By the end of April, the number of new FMD cases was declining 
sharply.  However, the last case of an infected farm was not until the end 
of September, and movement and access restrictions remained in place in 
parts of the country until well into 2002. In total, some 6.5 million 
livestock were destroyed to stamp out the disease and to deal with 
consequent animal welfare and marketing problems.  The costs to the 
Exchequer of the epidemic were about £3 billion and to the private sector 
£5 billion (National Audit Office 2002: 1). 
4.3  The Actors 
 
MAFF was the lead Government Ministry for the disease.  It and the State 
Veterinary Service were responsible for the processes of disease control 
and eradication, and various emergency procedures and measures were 
swung into action at the start.  
 
By mid-March, it was becoming apparent that MAFF was not getting on 
top of the disease, and press and public criticism mounted. As officials 
struggled to cope, many mistakes and blunders were made, leading to 
widespread charges of heavyhandedness and much public resentment in 
affected rural areas.  At the same time, it also became apparent that 
businesses dependent on tourism and visitors to the  countryside were 
beginning to suffer badly from the movement and access restrictions in 
place.  Indeed, their financial losses proved greater than those  incurred 
by the farming sector.  What had started as an animal disease problem 
was fast becoming a rural economy crisis. 
 
There was great political sensitivity towards the welter of press and 
public criticism. A general election was pending, and the previous 
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(Conservative) government had left office beset by questioning of its 
competence in managing BSE.  In office, the Labour Government had 
made much of its own managerial competence and just three months 
before the FMD outbreak had issued a rural White Paper expressing one 
of its primary objectives for farming as being “to get away from the cycle 
of short-term crises” (DETR/MAFF 2000). There was clearly a strong 
political need to reassert the government’s authority. In late March the 
Prime Minister took personal charge of the disease control campaign. At 
the same time the animal cull was extended and intensified and the army 
was brought in to speed up the slaughter and disposal of animals.   
 
This more concerted response by government could not quell the rising 
public disgust and anger at the consequences of the ruthless measures that 
were being taken. There was little that the Government could do to 
respond directly to these wider concerns in the midst of the eradication 
campaign.   Instead, it was locked into a course of action which 
demanded that efforts to stamp out the disease should be pursued with the 
utmost vigour, whatever the short-term damage to tourism interests, the 
rural economy, the image of the countryside and public credulity.  What 
sustained Ministers in this stance was the promise that radical change 
would follow the ending of the epidemic. 
 
Indeed, at the end of the first week of the outbreak and before the build 
up of criticism of the government, the Minister of Agriculture had 
announced a radical review of agriculture once the outbreak was over 
(The Times, 1st March 2001) and the Prime Minister had promised “a 
new deal for farming” (The Times, 2nd March 2001).  In the meantime, 
the Government had to keep various potential critics on board and it did 
so by setting up a Rural Task Force in mid-March, which incorporated 
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representatives from a wide range of central government departments and 
agencies, local and regional government, and business, tourism, 
conservation and other rural interests.  Despite its title, the Task Force 
was not allowed to interfere with the conduct of the FMD campaign, but 
it was given the remit: “to consider the implications of the outbreak of 
FMD for the rural economy, both immediately and in the longer term and 
to report to the Prime Minister on appropriate measures”.  It was chaired 
by the Environment Minister. 
 
The political management of the FMD crisis at the national level thus 
involved two parallel but largely separate policy networks.  The first one 
managed the disease eradication campaign.  The chief organisations 
involved - MAFF, the State Veterinary Service and the National Farmers’ 
Union (but not the Army) - were subject to ever more intense vilification 
as the number of livestock slaughtered rose relentlessly.  The second 
network oversaw short-term relief measures and longer-term recovery 
programmes for affected rural areas.  It included the members of the 
Rural Task Force and other rural organisations at the local and regional 
levels who played a crucial ‘delivery’ role in helping to re-open the 
countryside, promote the return of visitors,  implement remedial 
measures, and bring forward programmes for rural recovery.  Previously 
they had played no more than a minor or peripheral role in agricultural 
policy.  Now, with the legitimacy of what had been the core of the 
traditional agricultural policy network hollowed out, they came to 
constitute a new network for a policy field that had previously lacked 
coherence - rural policy.  
 
It is abundantly clear where Ministers wanted to stand in this changing 
political landscape.  With the number of FMD cases falling sharply in 
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May, the Prime Minister called an election.  The Labour Manifesto 
declared: 
“Labour is committed to support our countryside and the people 
who live and work in it.  We are committed to create a new 
department to lead renewal in rural areas - a Department for 
Rural Affairs”. 
 
Straight after the election in June, which Labour won, the Prime Minister 
announced the creation of a new Department of Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs and the abolition of MAFF.  Margaret Beckett was to be the 
new Secretary of State.  
 
One other major grouping of policy actors in the FMD crisis should be 
mentioned even though they kept a low profile throughout the crisis - that 
is the supermarkets.  They helped to ensure that a farming crisis did not 
become a food crisis.  In the first week of the crisis there was panic 
buying following the ban on livestock movement.  The supermarkets, 
though, urged shoppers not to panic buy and reassured them about future 
supplies.  Quickly they began placing orders for meat overseas.  A 
spokeswoman for Asda said they were breaking their normal guarantee of 
solely selling British meat and were buying meat from abroad to combat 
any possible shortages (BBC 2001). 
 
4.4   The adopted solutions 
 
The outbreak of FMD and, with it, Ministers’ suggestions that they 
wanted a fundamental review of agriculture once it was over unleashed a 
crescendo of critical comments and prescriptions. These reiterated or 
drew upon standard critiques of agricultural policy.  Media commentators 
were quick to assume that FMD was another consequence of modern 
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‘intensive farming’ even though the outbreak occurred in the most 
extensive livestock production systems and FMD had been recognised as 
an animal disease for at least four centuries.  There was much debate, 
though, about what drove ‘intensive farming’ which concentrated on 
most of the usual suspects: the CAP, the pursuit of cheap food and the 
drive for profits in the food chain.   
 
During the early weeks of the outbreak there was considerable 
investigative journalism into the arcane practices of the livestock supply 
chain.  Such reporting revealed that a particular factor behind the 
extensive spread of the disease was the large-scale movement of live 
animals. A Cabinet Office document on the outbreak estimated that two 
million sheep had moved about the country in the three weeks before the 
outbreak was discovered.  This issue touched upon concerns amongst 
various activist groups, for example over animal welfare and local 
sustainability, and many politicians and members of the public 
questioned why animals had to be moved around so much. 
 
Possible culprits for causing such apparently excessive movements 
included unscrupulous farmers and animal dealers, the complex and 
manipulable rules for CAP livestock payments, and the loss of local 
abattoirs brought about by a combination of EU hygiene standards and 
supermarket rationalisation of supply chains.  In fact, the fundamental 
practices involved - the movement of hill-born lambs to lowland pastures 
for fattening and farmer-to-farmer trading in livestock auction markets - 
are historic ones.  Nevertheless, the sense that such large-scale movement 
of stock was not right framed the debate about alternatives - captured in 
the Environment Minister’s remark very early in the crisis that he 
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favoured “more farmers’ markets, more local abattoirs and more local 
food production” (The Times, 1 March 2001). 
 
After the election, the government appointed a Policy Commission on the 
Future of Farming and Food charged with responsibility for charting a 
new strategy for agriculture.  It also appointed two other inquiries: one 
into the lessons to be learned from the FMD outbreak and its handling; 
and the other, under the Royal Society, into scientific questions on the 
prevention and control of infectious diseases in livestock.  With these 
three separate national inquiries, the government sought to draw a line 
and put the FMD crisis behind it. 
 
The Policy Commission reported in January 2002 and the two other 
inquiries in July of that year.  The central recommendation of the Lessons 
to be Learned Inquiry was that the Government should develop a national 
strategy for animal health and disease control (Anderson Inquiry 2002). 
The Royal Society’s report called for improvements to contingency 
planning and for consideration of emergency vaccination in any future 
epidemic (Royal Society 2002).  These two later reports occasioned little 
public debate other than a flurry of press coverage on the day of their 
publication.  In contrast, the Government spent most of 2002 consulting 
on the detailed recommendations of the Policy Commission. 
 
The Policy Commission was chaired by Sir Don Curry (Policy 
Commission on the Future of Farming and Food 2002), a livestock farmer 
with strong cooperative agribusiness interests, and included prominent 
members of the conservation and consumer lobbies as well as the Chief 
Executive of one of the largest supermarket chains.  The Commission was 
clearly intended to give direction to the new Department of the 
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Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.  In some respects, its membership 
represented DEFRA’s new political establishment. 
 
The overriding message of the Policy Commission’s report is the 
reconnection of farmers with their markets and the food supply chain, and 
of consumers with the countryside and how their food is produced.  The 
central recommendation of the report is for the UK to press for 
fundamental reform of the CAP, to bring about a market and consumer-
oriented agriculture whilst ensuring the conservation of the countryside.  
That would entail the complete removal of commodity price supports and 
production subsidies over the long term and their replacement by agri-
environment and rural development measures.  This process should 
commence straightaway with an increase in the rate of modulation: firstly 
to fund the rationalisation and expansion of agri-environment 
programmes, to cover the whole countryside; and secondly to  encourage 
farmers to produce and market higher quality and locally distinctive 
‘value added’ products, including the creation of shorter and more 
regionally embedded supply chains.  
 
The proposals to shift public support from production subsidies to 
countryside management incentives were fully in line with what 
conservation organisations had been pressing for, for some years.  Indeed, 
already such incentives, as part of agri-environmental programmes, were 
an established if minor strand of agricultural policy but were now set to 
become a major strand, a policy direction the Government had flagged 
pre-FMD in its decision taken in 1999 to pursue modulation (Lowe, 
Buller and Ward 2002).  Likewise, while conservation organisations 
already enjoyed an insider status with respect to agri-environmental 
programmes, they now became central players in the new framing of 
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agriculture-cum-countryside policy that followed from the setting up of 
DEFRA. 
 
The consumer and market-oriented approach to agri-food policy also pre-
dated FMD.  The promotion of local and regional food economies and 
speciality produce was meant to encourage farmers and processors to be 
more sensitive to consumer concerns and demands about food safety and 
quality which had been a major preoccupation of policy since BSE.  As 
well as seeking to stimulate this approach through product development 
and marketing grants to farmers and producer groups, the Government 
looked to the major retailers to play a key role, by ensuring quality 
assurance and market access, in the expansion of speciality and regional 
food supply chains.  The big supermarkets can play this role because they 
are trusted by consumers.  Survey research post-FMD has shown that, 
while many consumers are interested in the relationship between their 
food choices and sustainable farming, they expect nevertheless to 
exercise this choice through their normal sources for food purchase - few 
are willing to forsake the convenience of supermarket shopping 
(Weatherell et al 2003, forthcoming). 
 
The effect of the FMD crisis was thus to consolidate the position of a set 
of policy actors - particularly conservation organisations, consumer 
groups and the major food retailers - at the centre of policy.  Previously 
they had operated with a low profile within, or at the margins of, the 
agricultural policy system.  Crucially, their reputations had not been 
tarnished by the failings of agricultural policy.  What they offered to 
policy-making post-FMD was not only practicable policy alternatives but 
also new sources of legitimacy. 
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The Policy Commission’s proposals have thus been put at the heart of the 
government’s strategy for food and farming post-FMD. What is striking 
about the Policy Commission’s report and those of the other two 
inquiries, though, is the neglect of the problems facing the wider rural 
economy in the aftermath of FMD.  Yet, the distinctive feature of the 
FMD crisis was that it was not a farming-and-food crisis (unlike, say, 
BSE) but a farming-and-rural crisis.  The (mis)management of an animal 
disease had brought havoc to the economy of rural areas, but these wider 
ramifications of the FMD crisis, and what they revealed about the rural 
economy and its interconnectedness to farming, received scant attention.  
Instead, the new policy direction after FMD drew on policy critiques and 
alternatives formulated well before the FMD outbreak occurred. 
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5. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
The German and British agricultural political systems passed through 
major crises in 2001.  The immediate cause of the crisis in each case was 
an animal disease.  The history, epidemiology and possible consequences 
for animal and human health of the two diseases were extremely 
different.  Even so, the crises ran remarkably parallel courses and had 
strikingly similar features.  These parallels and similarities relate to 
common characteristics and constraints in the complex management of 
contemporary agri-food systems.  What both crises revealed is the critical 
importance of public trust to the smooth running of agri-food systems.  
Public trust was severely shaken, with possibly profound long-term 
consequences, but what heightened the crises in the short-term was the 
immediate consumer reaction, as people either stopped buying beef or 
visiting the countryside.  The crises thus had short-term and long-term 
components which had to be addressed concurrently. 
 
Measures had to be to put in place to manage and control disease risks.  
In a sense this was the straightforward aspect of the task involving as it 
did the regulatory apparatus for the protection of animal and public 
health.  With impressive (at least, to British eyes) alacrity, the German 
government put in place preventative and monitoring measures to exclude 
BSE-contaminated material from the food chain.8  In contrast, the British 
government struggled to get on top of the FMD outbreak which had 
overwhelmed its own rather perfunctory contingency planning. 
 
                                                
8
 There had been earlier cases of BSE in Germany, associated with the British outbreak (and blamed on 
British exports).  In taking measures against BSE, the German Government could also draw on the 
British experience. 
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The steps taken to curb the disease risk, however, did not placate public 
anxieties, but heightened them further.  What was particularly 
problematic was risk communication.  German consumers doubted the 
safety of their food, and the British government unwittingly conveyed the 
impression that the countryside was an unsafe, or at least unsavoury, 
place to go.  At the heart of the risk communication problems was a loss 
of trust in government and official sources of information.  The public 
and consumers seeking additional or alternative information looked 
elsewhere.  The mass media came to play a key role in providing 
information, and thus also in heightening public awareness and in 
framing the problem. 
 
The loss of legitimacy affected the main actors in the agricultural political 
system - the government and the farming unions.  To rebuild legitimacy 
other actors had to be brought in who commanded public trust and were 
beyond media reproach.  New directions for agricultural policy were then 
constructed around the alternative solutions advanced by these actors.  In 
Germany this meant engaging with the Agrarian Opposition and its 
advocacy of organic, sustainable and welfare-friendly farming.  In Britain 
it meant even deeper engagement with the conservation lobby and the 
major food retailers, and the reorientation of policy towards conserving 
the countryside and making the agri-food system more market-
responsive. 
 
These distinct policy directions reflect Anglo-German differences in the 
structure and priorities of the environmental movement, in consumer 
concerns and in the structure of the agri-food system.  An additional 
factor is attitudes towards state regulatory authority.  Until BSE, 
Germany had not been so beset by farming-and-food crises as Britain 
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had.  Arguably, therefore, the BSE crisis was much more of a shock in 
Germany than the FMD crisis was in Britain. While this provided a 
political opportunity for the Green Party, there was not the same sense of 
yet further haemorrhaging of governmental authority in relation to 
farming and food as there was in Britain.  Thus, German efforts to set the 
political management of the agri-food system back on track are firmly 
rooted in the view that this is a regulatory task of the state in which 
agricultural policy plays a key role.  What is new is an overriding 
commitment to a food safety approach and a refurbished agrarian 
ideology based on organic production and the family farming model. In 
contrast, after the FMD crisis, Britain sought to bury its Ministry of 
Agriculture and went yet further towards the governance of the agri-food 
system, including strong elements of ‘private-interest’ government 
orchestrated from the retail end of the food chain. 
 
As well as organic, more informal and marketing-oriented modes of 
regulation of the agri-food system are being pursued in Britain, using 
motifs like ‘local’ and ‘quality assured’, that are apparently more 
responsive to consumer demand.  A central role is being played in this 
regard by the UK supermarkets.  A key outcome from the Policy 
Commission on the Future of Food and Farming was the setting up of a 
National Food Chain Centre to improve internal practices and 
communications within whole food chains.  Significantly the Government 
passed on responsibility for setting up the Centre to the Institute of 
Grocery Distributors, a food sector body in which the major supermarkets 
play a prominent role.  Thus, in the aftermath of FMD, there was yet 
another significant extension of private interest government of the agri-
food system.  As Marsden et al have commented, referring to the general 
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decline (pre-FMD) in public trust in the regulation of the agri-food 
system: 
 “The ability of … retailers to manage the quality of foods 
through their supply chains has been enhanced … as the 
growing crisis in food consumption has taken hold.  As a 
result, new relations have been forged between public and 
private regulation” (Marsden et al 2000, p.102). 
 
In contrast, in Germany, there is no comparable relationship between the 
Federal State and food retailers.  It appears that there remains a much 
stronger faith in the state as the guarantor of the public interest.  
Moreover, the structure of food retailing (more fragmented, and more 
competitive) would preclude German retailers from adopting a 
comparable role to the British supermarkets in the political management 
of the agri-food system.9 
 
It remains to be seen which is the more effective approach in the long-
term to the political management of the agri-food system.  It is 
noteworthy that the FMD crisis in the UK did not become a food crisis.  
Arguably it had the potential to do so.  That it did not, is testimony to a 
certain robustness in consumer trust towards the emerging system of agri-
food system governance in the UK (Food Standards Agency 2003).  
What FMD demonstrated however was that there was no equivalent 
system of alternative governance to cover for a steadily retreating state in 
relation to the territorial management of the countryside. 
 
The longer term strategies for the agri-food system being pursued in 
Germany and the UK make fundamental and largely hypothetical 
                                                
9
 This may be the reason why the German legislature has not yet imposed the strong product warranty 
rules on retailers that are in place in Britain. 
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assumptions about consumer behaviour which may prove to be 
unfounded.  In part because of the concatenation within the crises of 
short-term and long-term components, the strategies are based on an 
implicit assumption that the consumer and public concerns and 
sensitivities revealed through the crisis are guides to long-term 
tendencies in consumer behaviour.  Thus, at the height of the BSE crisis, 
consumers altered their food purchasing patterns and showed less price 
sensitivity but more sensitivity to the origins and production methods of 
the food they bought.  Organic sales in particular rose sharply.  However, 
after the crisis there was a return largely to normal consumption 
behaviour, including a drop in organic sales.  Consumer demand for 
organics would seem to be modest.  Yet it is seen as the foundation on 
which to reconstruct the agri-food system.  There is a risk that the new 
strategies have been built on over optimistic assumptions about the scale 
of demand and the willingness of consumers to pay. 
 
The events surrounding the discovery of BSE in Germany and the 
outbreak of FMD in Britain illustrate policy systems that are changing 
direction in the midst of a crisis.  Change in policy systems under such 
circumstances is not completely surprising.  Crises discredit accepted 
norms and procedures which both leads to demands for fundamental 
change while it weakens some of the established structures and interests 
that would normally be obstacles to fundamental change. Thus several 
researchers have shown how the new political situation created by an 
externally induced crisis can lead to fresh opportunities or possibilities: 
whether for actors, to play a new or different role in the policy field; for 
policy reforms, to gain acceptance because of altered priorities; or for 
novel issues, to attract attention because of changed perspectives (e.g. 
Kingdon 1995, Zahariadis 1999). Thus crises may come to be seen as 
 42 
‘windows of opportunity’, opening up the possibility to depart from the 
normal path in a policy field or to initiate reforms (Kingdon 1995, 
Sabatier 1999).  This may be of particular significance either in policy 
fields (such as consumer protection or rural affairs) that lack an 
institutional framework, or in an entrenched policy field such as 
agriculture in which, it is often judged, necessary reforms do not get 
enough support under normal conditions (Daugbjerg 1999). Margaret 
Beckett saw the FMD outbreak in these terms, commenting “the farming 
industry … faced difficult challenges before that outbreak.  The epidemic 
accelerated the need for change … I am determined to make the most of 
the opportunity we now have to look again at the future of farming” 
(Beckett 2001). 
 
There was thus political impetus behind the respective responses of the 
British and German governments.  After all, crises do not necessarily 
precipitate reform.  A comparison of the responses of Western European 
governments to the BSE crisis shows that they, in fact, did not follow the 
German example of a sharp change of direction in agricultural policy 
(Oosterveer 2002).  If we see the potential role of a crisis in catalysing 
policy reforms as that of shifting pro- and anti- forces in the society and 
economy, then much may depend on how ‘ripe’ for change a particular 
policy system is nationally.  In this regard, what is striking in both the 
German BSE case and the British FMD case is that, within a few days of 
the start of the crisis, the respective leaders of the government (Schröder 
and Blair) had publicly signalled the need for a major rethink of 
agricultural policy.  In the era of complex government and policy systems 
locked into statis or incremental change, there is evidently scope for 
political leaders to use crises selectively, to remove what they see as 
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logjams to change.10 Both the Schröder and Blair governments regarded 
agriculture as a policy field in need of reform. They had previously 
pursued an agenda of modernisation and international competitiveness 
which had alienated established agricultural interests.  The crisis, and its 
attendant media attention, offered an opportunity to try a different tack to 
reform, that would appeal beyond these established interests, to urban 
consumers and the environmental movement.  In a sense, then, the crisis 
exposed the dilemma of modern Social Democratic parties towards 
agriculture, of whether or not to pursue globalising or communitarian 
approaches. 
 
Our interest has been to understand what structured the new policy 
directions taken and we sought to illuminate the decision process during 
the crises by using the Garbage Can Model. However, the original 
Garbage Can Model was developed  to explain decision making in an 
organisation, not on a national level. The need for future research to 
anchor the framework within specific institutional contexts had already 
been identified (Zahariadis 1999). So we enlarged the model with 
structuring terms from policy analysis, to understand what influenced 
policy decision making during the crises.  This enlargement was very 
helpful in comparing and isolating which forces played a crucial role, and 
also in revealing how deeply economic factors, institutional structures 
and public opinion influenced the actors and the policy process. Further 
research along these lines could fruitfully draw even more on approaches 
such as the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier 1999), or actor-
oriented institutionalism (Scharpf 2000) which focus on the crucial forces 
                                                
10
 Crises may also allow political leaders to demonstrate to the electorate their leadership skills - both 
Schröder and Blair faced impending elections. 
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at work rather than on problems and solutions. Indeed, integrating the key 
aspects of the Garbage Can Model - that solutions do not necessarily have 
to be related to specific problems and that decision making can be 
irrational - into theories dealing with policy incrementalism and policy 
change would seem to offer a fuller understanding of what forces have an 
impact on political decisions, especially in fields such as agriculture 
where periods of policy stasis are occasionally punctuated by crises.  
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